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Abstract
In recent years social network analysis (SNA) has enhanced our understanding of how terrorist networks organize themselves 
and has offered potential strategies for their disruption.  To date, however, SNA research of terrorist networks has tended to 
focus on key actors within the network who score high in terms of centrality or whose structural location (i.e., their loca-
tion within the overall network) allows them to broker information and/or resources within the network.  However, while 
such a focus is intuitively appealing and can provide short-term satisfaction, it may be putting the cart before the horse. 
Before jumping to the identification of key actors, we need to first explore a network’s overall topography.  Research sug-
gests that networks that are too provincial (i.e., dense, high levels of clustering, an overabundance of strong ties) too cosmo-
politan (i.e., sparse, low levels of clustering, an overabundance of weak ties), too hierarchical (i.e., centralized, low levels 
of variance) and/or too heterarchical (i.e., decentralized, high levels of variance) tend not to perform as well as networks 
that maintain a balance between these extremes.  If these dynamics hold true for terrorist networks as well, then the key 
player approach may be appropriate in some circumstances, but may lead to deleterious results in others. More important-
ly, it suggests that analysts need to consider a network’s overall topography before crafting strategies for their disruption.
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1. Introduction and Background
 Roberts and Everton (2009) recently argued that while social 
network analysis (SNA) has wide appeal as a methodology for tar-
geting members of terrorist networks, it possesses a much wider 
application than is currently being used.  Furthermore, they argued 
that strategy should drive the choice of metrics rather than the other 
way around. Unfortunately, just the opposite appears to be hap-
pening.  The tail (i.e., the choice of metrics) is wagging the dog 
(strategic choices).  Indeed, the most common application of SNA 
to the study of terrorist networks has been the key player approach, 
which focuses on targeting key actors within the network for elimi-
nation or capture (a.k.a. the “whack-a-mole” strategy). 
  While the focus on key individuals is intuitively appealing and 
might provide short-term results, such a focus may be misplaced 
and, in fact, may make tracking, disrupting and destabilizing ter-
rorist networks more difficult.  As Brafman and Beckstrom (2006) 
have noted, targeting key players in decentralized organizations 
seldom shuts them down.  Instead, it only drives them to become 
more decentralized, making them even harder to target. 
  In terms of terrorist networks, such a strategy may in fact ex-
acerbate what Sageman (2008) refers to as the “leaderless jihad,” 
by which he means the numerous independent and local groups 
that have branded themselves with the Al Qaeda name and are at-
tempting to emulate bin Laden and his followers in conceiving and 
executing terrorist operations from the bottom up.
 Here it is suggested that analysts need to first explore a terrorist 
network’s overall topography (i.e., its level of density, centraliza-
tion, clustering, etc.) before estimating brokerage, centrality and 
other types of metrics. 
 This is not to say analysts have completely neglected the topo-
graphical dimensions of terrorist networks.  There have been ex-
ceptions.  Pedahzur and Perliger (2006), for example, noted that 
terrorist networks with a large number of cliques appear to be more 
effective than those with few, and the U.S. Army’s most recent 
counterinsurgency manual (U.S. Army, 2007) argues that network 
density is positively associated with network efficiency and, as 
such, should guide tactics.  Perhaps the best known example is 
Sageman’s (2004b) initial study of what he calls the Global Salafi 
Jihad (GSJ) in which he found that the GSJ exhibits the character-
istics of a scale-free network.  This discovery led him to argue that 
the United States should focus its efforts on taking out hubs (i.e., 
nodes that have many connections) rather than randomly stopping 
terrorists at borders. “[The latter] may stop terrorists from coming 
here, but will leave the network undisturbed.  However… if the 
hubs are destroyed, the system breaks down into isolated nodes or 
sub-groups. The jihad will be incapable of mounting sophisticated 
large scale operations like the 9/11 attacks and be reduced to small 
attacks by singletons” (Sageman, 2004a). 
 While the simultaneous removal of 10-15% of a terrorist net-
work’s hubs is easier said than done, and subsequent research has 
found that hubs are often quickly replaced by other, highly central 
and/or structurally equivalent actors (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006; 
Tsvetovat & Carley, 2005), it does not change the fact that Sage-
man’s approach illustrates how the exploration of a network’s 
overall topography can inform strategic decision-making.
2. Hypothesis and Aims
 In this paper I explore two interrelated but analytically dis-
tinct topographical dimensions of networks that appear to affect 
network performance: what I call the (1) provincial-cosmopolitan 
and (2) heterarchical-hierarchical dimensions.  I begin by drawing 
on “light network” research, defined as networks that are overt and 
legal as opposed to “dark networks,” which are covert and illegal 
networks such as terrorist networks (Milward & Raab, 2006; Raab 
& Milward, 2003), This research suggests that networks that are 
too provincial (e.g., dense, high levels of clustering, an overabun-
dance of strong ties) or too cosmopolitan (e.g., sparse, low levels 
of clustering, an overabundance of weak ties) tend to perform more 
poorly than networks that maintain a balance between the two.  
 Next, I turn to a series of studies that suggest that a similar 
dynamic is at work in terms of how hierarchical a network is: 
networks that are too hierarchical (e.g., centralized, high levels 
of variance) or too heterarchical (e.g., decentralized, low levels 
of variance) tend to under-perform those that lie between the two 
extremes.  I then note that if these same dynamics hold true for 
terrorist and other forms of dark networks, then the central actor 
approach may be appropriate in some circumstances but not in oth-
ers.  More broadly I argue that analysts need to take into account 
a network’s overall topography before crafting strategies or their 
disruption.  Consequently, I conclude by suggesting what these 
studies imply for strategic decision-making in terms of tracking 
and disrupting dark networks.
3. Types of Networks
3.1 Provincial and Cosmopolitan Networks
 
 In what is now regarded as a classic study, Granovetter (1973, 
1974) discovered that when it came to finding their current job 
people were far more likely to have used personal contacts than 
other means.  Moreover, of those who found their jobs through 
personal contacts, most were weak ties (i.e., acquaintances) rather 
than strong ones (i.e., close friends).  This occurred because people 
tend to have more weak ties than strong ties (because weak ties 
demand less of our time), and because weak ties are more likely 
to form the crucial bridges that tie together densely knit clusters 
of people (see Figure 1).  Granovetter argued that weak ties often 
connected otherwise disconnected groups.  Thus, whatever is to be 
spread (e.g., information, influence, and other types of resources), 
it will reach a greater number of people when it passes through 
weak ties rather than strong ones (Granovetter, 1973:1366).  More-
over, actors with few weak ties are more likely to be “confined to 
the provincial news and views of their close friends” (Granovetter, 
1983:202).
 Granovetter does not argue that strong ties are of no value.  He 
notes that while weak ties provide individuals with access to infor-
mation and resources beyond those available in their immediate 
social circles, strong ties have greater motivation to be sources of 
support in times of uncertainty (Granovetter, 1983:209).  Others 
have noted this as well (see e.g., Krackhardt, 1992; Stark, 2007). 
“There is a mountain of research showing that people with strong 
ties are happier and even healthier because in such networks mem
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bers provide one another with strong emotional and material sup-
port in times of grief or trouble and someone with whom to share 
life’s joys and triumphs” (Stark, 2007:37).  This suggests that peo-
ple’s networks differ in terms of their mix of weak and strong ties. 
Individuals’ networks range from local or provincial ones, consist-
ing of primarily of strong, redundant ties and very few weak ties, 
to worldly or cosmopolitan ones, consisting of numerous weak 
ties and very few strong ties (Stark, 2007:37-38).  It also suggests 
that peoples’ networks should ideally consist of a mix of weak and 
strong ties.  They should be neither too provincial nor too cos-
mopolitan but rather land somewhere between the two extremes.
 Pescosolido and Georgianna’s (1989) study of suicide illus-
trates this dynamic.  It found that social network density has a cur-
vilinear (or inverted U) relationship to suicide.  Individuals who 
are embedded in very sparse (i.e., cosmopolitan) and very dense 
(i.e., provincial) social networks are far more likely to commit 
suicide than are people who are embedded in moderately dense 
networks.  Why?  People who are embedded in sparse social net-
works often lack the social and emotional ties that provide them 
the support they need during times of crisis. They also typically 
lack ties to others who might otherwise prevent them from en-
gaging in self-destructive (i.e., deviant) behavior (Finke & Stark, 
2005; Granovetter, 2005).  On the other hand, individuals who are 
embedded in very dense networks are often cut-off from people 
outside of their immediate social group, which increases the prob-
ability that they will lack the ties to others who could prevent them 
from taking the final, fatal step.
 An ideal mix of weak and strong ties appears to provide ben-
efits at the individual level as well as at the organizational level. 
In his study of the New York garment industry, Brian Uzzi (1996) 
found that a mix of weak and strong ties proved beneficial to the 
long-term survival of apparel firms.  The firms he studied tended to 
divide their market interactions into two types: “market” or “arms-
length” relationships (i.e., weak ties) and “special” or “close” re-
lationships (i.e., strong ties), which Uzzi refers to as “embedded” 
ties.  He found that while market tieswere more common than em-
bedded ones, the latter tended to be more important in situations 
where trust was of overriding importance, where detailed informa
tion had to be passed to others, and when certain types of joint 
problem-solving were on the table (Uzzi, 1996:677).  According 
to Uzzi, embeddedness increases economic effectiveness along 
a number of dimensions crucial to competitiveness in the global 
economy: organizational learning, risk-sharing and speed-to-mar-
ket.  However, he also found that firms that are too embedded often 
suffer because they do not have access to information from distant 
parts of the network, which makes them vulnerable to a rapidly 
changing environment.  This led him to argue that firms should 
seek to maintain a balance of embedded and market ties and found 
that an inverted U relationship exists between the degree of embed-
dedness and the probability of firm failure (Uzzi, 1996:675-676).
 Interestingly, Uzzi and Spiro (2005) found that an inverted U 
relationship also existed in the extent to which the networks of cre-
ative teams producing Broadway musicals from 1945 to 1989 ex-
hibited “small-worldness” and the probability that a musical would 
be a critical and financial success.  They believe that this relation-
ship existed because up to a point, connectivity and cohesion facili-
tate the flow of diverse and innovative material across the network. 
Moreover, connectivity and cohesion make risk-taking among the 
teams more likely because they are embedded in networks of trust.
However, as connectivity and cohesion increase, homogenization 
and imitation set in and returns become negative.
In other words, initially connectivity and cohesion increase a net-
work’s overall creativity by encouraging human innovation, but 
beyond a certain point, they begin to stifle it.
 While it may be (morally) difficult to conceive of terrorist net-
works as varying in their ability to encourage innovative thinking 
and creative risk-taking, these studies should give us pause.  They 
suggest that in order to be successful, terrorist networks can be nei-
ther too provincial nor too cosmopolitan.  Of course, what consti-
tutes the optimum balance of strong and weak ties will most likely 
vary depending on the environment in which it operates (e.g., the 
IRA can operate more openly in Ireland than Al-Qaeda can in the 
United States), but that still should not discourage analysts from 
exploring and documenting this topographical feature of dark net-
works.
As the level of Q increases, separate clusters become 
more interlinked and linked by persons who know 
each other. The processes distribute creative mate-
rial among teams and help to build a cohesive social 
organization within teams that support risky collabo-
ration around good ideas  (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005:464).
Increased structural connectivity reduces some of the 
creative distinctiveness of clusters, which can homog-
enize the pool of creative material. At the same time, 
problems of excessive cohesion can creep in. The 
ideas most likely to flow can be conventional rather 
than fresh ideas because of the common information 
effect and because newcomers find it harder to land 
“slots” on productions (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005:464).
Figure 1. Strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973, 1983)
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3.2 Heterarchical and Hierarchical Networks
 
 Another more well-developed body of research has explored 
how the degree to which an organization is hierarchically struc-
tured impacts its performance (see e.g., Nohria & Eccles, 1992; Po-
dolny & Page, 1998; Powell, 1985, 1990; Powell & Smith-Doerr, 
1994).  This literature typically identifies two ideal types of orga-
nizational form: networks and hierarchies.  The former are seen 
as decentralized, informal and/or organic, while the latter are seen 
as centralized, formal and/or bureaucratic (Burns & Stalker, 1961; 
Powell, 1990; Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001).  While this distinction 
is useful (and appropriate) in some contexts (see, e.g. Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt, 2001; Castells, 1996; Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell & 
Smith-Doerr, 1994; Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001), it is probably bet-
ter to think of these two ideal types as poles on either end of a 
continuum, running from highly decentralized forms on one end to 
highly centralized forms on the other.
 More importantly, at least for our purposes here, research sug-
gests that this dimension impacts network performance much like 
the provincial-cosmopolitan dimension: that is, an optimal level 
of centralization or hierarchy exists.  For example, Rodney Stark 
(1987, 1996), in his analysis of why some new religious move-
ments succeed, identified centralized authority as an important 
factor. Nevertheless, he notes that too much centralization can be 
a bad thing and successful religious movements, such as the Mor-
mon (LDS) Church, balance centralized authority structures with 
decentralized ones:
 Like the provincial-cosmopolitan dimension, the optimal level 
along the heterarchical-hierarchical dimension varies depending 
on environmental context.  Decentralized structures are generally 
seen as better suited for solving nonroutine, complex and/or rapid-
ly-changing problems or challenges because of their adaptability, 
while centralized ones are better suited for stable environments 
where economies of scale are of paramount importance (Granovet-
ter, 1985; Raab & Milward, 2003). Saxenian (1994, 1996), for in-
stance, contends that Silicon Valley emerged as the center of the 
high technology universe because it developed a highly-flexible 
industrial network — characterized by a horizontally integrated in-
dustrial system, flat corporate structures, friendly local institutions, 
a supportive culture and a heterarchical institutional infrastructure 
— that was more responsive to the volatile high technology in-
dustry than were other regional areas.  And, in his reflection on 
the structure of terrorist organizations, David Tucker (2008) argues 
that while network forms of organization are useful for some tasks 
But it would be wrong to stress only the hierarchical 
nature of LDS authority and its authoritarian as-
pects, for the Latter-day Saints display an amazing 
degree of amateur participation at all levels of their 
formal structure. Moreover, this highly authoritar-
ian body also displays extraordinary levels of par-
ticipatory democracy—to a considerable extent the 
rank-and-file Saints are the church. A central aspect 
of this is that among the Latter-day Saints to be a 
priest is an unpaid, part-time role that all committed 
males are expected to fulfill (Stark, 2005:125).
(e.g., mobilization), they are not useful for others (e.g., security). 
He also notes that the optimal form of organization depends largely 
on the environment in which an organization operates:
 Once again too much of a good thing can lead networks to 
underperform, and unless it is demonstrated otherwise, there is no 
reason to suspect that this same dynamic applies to terrorist net-
works.  From their perspective they cannot be too centralized or 




 This brief analysis of the relationship between network effec-
tiveness and network topography suggests that analysts seeking to 
disrupt dark networks will want to pursue policies that push dark 
networks toward the tails of these two dimensions (see Figure 2).
 For example, a scenario where analysts are seeking to disrupt a 
terrorist network that lies on the centralized side of the continuum. 
If, in such a scenario, they target a central actor for capture or elim-
ination and are successful, they may cause the network to become 
less centralized and actually more effective.  Instead, they may 
want to implement a misinformation campaign that breeds distrust 
between the network’s inner circle and its peripheral members that 
will hopefully lead the former to centralize decision-making, com-
munication and strategic functions even more than they currently 
are.  Or again, analysts may seek to disrupt a somewhatprovincial 
terrorist network by adopting a strategy that causes it to turn in 
on itself (e.g., peeling off peripheral members through an amnesty 
campaign), thus making it more provincial and less effective. 
 The important point here is that the topographical features of 
terrorist networks should inform strategic decision-making, both 
The most important issue is how well an organiza-
tion’s structure is adapted to its environment, which 
includes what its enemies are doing, given what the 
organization wants to achieve and the resources 
available to it. No one organizational structure is 
always inherently superior to another. Some are bet-
ter for some things, some for others. These princi-
ples apply to al Qaeda as well as the governmental 
network (the federal, state, and local governments) 
in the United States (Tucker, 2008:2).
Figure 2. Hypothesized relationship between network topography and 
effectiveness (Note: Graphic generated using R (R Development Core 
Team, 2009)
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of which should come before analysts estimate centrality and other 
standard social network metrics. 
5. Quantifying Network Topography
 A number of metrics exist to quantify the topographical fea-
tures of networks.  In terms of the heterarchical-hierarchical di-
mension, degree, closeness and betweenness centralization all of-
fer glimpses into how centralized a network is although we need 
to be careful how we interpret our results.  In general, the larger 
a centralization index is, the more likely it is that a single actor is 
very central while the other actors are not (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994:176), so they can be seen as measuring how unequal the dis-
tribution of individual actor values are. Thus, we need to interpret 
the various indices in terms of the types of centrality estimated.  
 An alternative measure recommended by Hoivik and Gleditsch 
(1975) and Coleman (1964) is the variance of degree centrality 
found in a network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994:177, 180-181). 
Finally, if we are working with directed data, then Krackhardt’s 
(1994) graph theoretical measures of hierarchy can be quite infor-
mative.  To date, however, most social network analyses of terrorist 
networks have collected undirected data.
 Network density is probably the most commonly used metric 
tapping into the provincial-cosmopolitan dimension.  Unfortunate-
ly, network density tends to decrease as social networks get larger 
because the number of possible lines increases rapidly with the 
number of actors whereas the number of relations which each actor 
can maintain is generally limited.  Consequently, it is of limited use 
as a measure. We can use it to compare networks of the same size, 
but that is about all.  An alternative suggested by Scott (2000:75-
76) and de Nooy et al (2005:63) is to calculate a network’s average 
degree centrality.  While it is positively associated with “provin-
cialness” of networks, it is not sensitive to network size, which 
allows analysts to use it to compare networks of different size.
 The small world statistic developed by Uzzi and Spiro (2005) 
to measure the small-worldness of networks of Broadway musi-
cal teams also taps into the provincial-cosmopolitan dimension 
and is worth exploring in some detail here (Humphries and Gurney 
(2008) developed the identical statistic apparently independently 
of Uzzi and Spiro).  As noted above, small world networks are 
those where actors cluster into tight-knit groups and the average 
path length between them is low (Watts & Strogatz, 1998).  Local 
clustering (CC) is measured by taking the average of the proportion 
of an actor’s neighbors who also have ties with one another (also 
known as ego-network density), while average path length (APL) 
is calculated by taking the average of all the shortest path lengths 
(i.e., geodesics) between all actors in the network.  These measures 
are then typically normalized by calculating the ratio between them 




 Thus, the more that a network’s CC
Ratio 
exceeds 1.0 and the 
closer its APL
Ratio
 approaches 1.0, the more it resembles a small 
world network.  Uzzi & Spiro and Humphries & Gurney quantified 
the relationship between the CC
Ratio
  and  APL
Ratio
 by calculating 




 Later analysis by Uzzi (2008) found that it was unnecessary 
to compute small world Q in order to predict the probability that 
a musical would be a critical and financial success.  Instead, all 
that was needed was the CC
Ratio
.  Why?  Because the APL
Ratio
 
almost always approximated 1.0 and recent research (Everton 
& Lieberman, 2009) demonstrates that Uzzi’s discovery was 
not an exception but the rule.  In most networks the PL
Ratio
 will 
approximate 1.00.  Moreover, because a near-perfect correlation 
exists between the density of an actual network and the CC of a 
comparable random network, there is no need to generate the latter. 
Small world Q can be estimated by simply calculating the ratio of 
a network’s CC to its density.
 Unfortunately, at this point we do not know what consti-
tutes a cosmopolitan, provincial, hierarchical and/or heterar-
chical terrorist network.  Table 1 lists the relevant social net-
work measures of the “trust,” “operational” and “combined” 
networks of the Noordin Top Terrorist network, but how these 
measures compare to those generated by other studies is unclear 
because there is not sufficient data to make such comparison.
CC
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The Noordin Top Terrorist Trust Network data are drawn from the International Crisis Group’s (2006) report 
on the terrorist networks of Noordin Mohammed Top, who is believed to be responsible for the 2003 JW Mar-
riott Hotel and 2004 Australian Embassy bombings in Jakarta, the 2005 Bali bombing and the 2009 JW Mar-
riott and Ritz Carlton bombings in Jakarta.  The initial data were collected and coded by students as part of 
the “Tracking and Disrupting Dark Networks” course offered at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California, under the supervision of Dr. Nancy Roberts.  Portions of the data have been updated by students 
in subsequent iterations of the course (through the Spring of 2009) as well as from other articles and reports 
by Dr. Sean Everton.  One and two-mode network data were collected on a variety of relations (e.g., friend-
ship, kinship, internal communications) and affiliations (e.g., schools, religious, businesses, training events, 
operations).  I constructed three one-mode, multi-relational networks (trust, operational and combined) 
based on the relations listed below.  Dichotomized versions of the networks were used to calculate metrics: 
Trust-Network
 • Friendship: Defined as close attachments through affection or esteem between two people. Friendship ties do 
   not include ties based on meetings and/ or school ties.
 • Kinship: Defined as a family connection based on marriage. It includes current marriages and past marriages 
   due to divorces and or deaths. 
 • Religious Affiliation: Defined as association with a mosque.  It does not include Islamic schools – see next
   category – eve though such schools have mosques.
 • School Affiliation: Educational relations are defined as schools where individuals received formal educa-
   tion. This includes both religious and secular institutions. 
 
Operational Network
 • Internal communications: Defined as ties based on the relaying of messages between individuals and/or
   groups inside the nework through some sort of medium.
 • Logistical place (Defined as key places where logistical activity – providing materials, weapons, trans-
   portation and safehouses occurred.  
  • Operations: Includes terrorists who were directly involved with the Australian Embassy bombing, the Bali 
   Bombing, the Bali II bombing and/or the Marriott Hotel bombing, either at the scene (e.g., suicide bomb-
   ers, commanders) or as a direct support to those at the scene (e.g., driver or lookout).  It does not include  
   ties formed through communications, logistics, or organizations related to the operations.
 • Terrorist Financing:  Defined as the for-profit and not-for-profit businesses and foundations that employ 
   members of the network. 
 • Terrorist Organizational Membership: Defined as an administrative and functional system, whose primar 
   common goal is the operational conduct of terrorist/insurgent activities, consisting of willingly affiliated 
   claimant members. Factions and offshoots are considered separate from their parent organization.
 • Training: Defined as participation in any specifically designated activity that teaches the knowledge, skills, 
   and competencies of terrorism.  It does not include participation in a terrorist sponsored act or mujahedeen 
   activity in places such as Afghanstan, Bosnia, Chechnya or Iraq unless the individuals’ presence was to par-
   ticipate in a specifically designated training camp or base in one of these areas.
Noordin Top’s Terrorist Trust Network
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